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RITUAL TALK
PHIL MANNING

Abstract The analysis of talk is important for Goffman's examination of the self in face-toface interaction. Here I suggest that his target is best described as being our ritual talk.
Goffman defined ritual in two ways: as the smooth running of everyday encounters and as
the honouring of the selves who people them. He suggested that ritual talk is structured by
both prevailing rules of social interaction and by the sequential organization of talk.
However, on occasion he hinted that this account is too simple. I agree, and suggest ways
of furthering his investigations.

Introduction
In this paper I look at Erving Goffman's account of the way the self is displayed in
everyday talk. I call this 'ritual talk' - an expression referring to the way talk can be
used to accommodate and honour people. Individuals are accommodated by
discretion and tact, and honoured by an array of passing exchanges. Talk of this
kind exhibits the normative constraints which Goffman regularly exposed in a wide
variety of contexts and activities, and to this extent ritual talk is rule-governed.
However, it is remarkably difficult to specify the rules that govern ritual talk - a
problem which, incidentally, plagued the formulations of Goffman's doctorate.
Here I suggest a solution which is in the spirit of one of Goffman's later texts,
Relations in Public (1971): the solution being that ritual talk displays the rules of
interaction governing conduct among 'ratified' 1 strangers. By using this as a
bedrock specification for everyday interaction, it becomes possible to see rulebreaking as a resource for affirming friendship. However, the resource is precarious
and can backfire, as appropriate levels of rule-breaking vary between friendships,
and all too frequently remedial work is required. Matters are made more complex by
Goffman's distinction between the person and the self. By 'person' he referred to an
entity of flesh and bone, by 'self' the claims projected on the person's behalf. These
claims are, in Goffman's word, a person's 'footing', and we often project several
selves during face-to-face interaction. The rule-breaking dilemma becomes even
more complicated as people struggle to honour perversely the different and often
competing selves of those around them. In his early work Goffman considered this
dilemma in a paper concerning embarrassment. Much later he produced a kindred
analysis of the performances of disc-jockeys, showing the ways in which they
skilfully reduce themselves to single self beings in order to protect a prevailing
definition of the situation. Radio talk provides valuable data about ritual talk
because disc jockeys frequently project a friendly self which is obliged to treat
strangers as if they were friends. Further, the hallmark of the professional disc
jockey is the affirmation of friendship without recourse to ritualised rule-breaking.
Disc jockeys have few resources with which to convey a sense of friendship, and yet
somehow they succeed. And there is a further restriction to be considered: ritual talk

honours selves within the constraints issued by what Harvey Sacks called the
'machinery' of talk. This paper hopes to merge sequential studies of conversation
with ritualistic ones in order to explore various presentations of self in talk.

Talk and Rule Following
Goffman's interest in everyday talk stemmed from his doctoral dissertation,
Communication Conduct in an Island Community, which began: 'This is a report on
a study of conversational interaction' (1953:1). His particular concern during this
study was to identify the conversational practices which occur in face-to-face
interaction (1953:1), his assumption being that these must, in some sense, be 'rulegoverned'. In the introduction to the doctorate he treated this awkward question
cautiously, commenting:
When in the field, I tried to record happenings between persons regardless of how
uninteresting and picayune these events seemed then to be. The assumption was that all
interaction between persons took place in accordance with certain patterns ... (1953:3).
The description of interaction as 'patterned' suggests something which is loosely
habitual; it connotes a regularity without evoking more definitive ideas about 'rules
of interaction', a formula which is vulnerable to the exceptional case. Definitive
ideas of this sort were incompatible with his field observations: whilst writing
Communication Conduct he discovered that however he stipulated rules of
interaction there were occasions when rules could be broken in a communally
approved way. A major problem for the thesis was to preserve the idea of following
a normative rule despite the observation that the words 'following' and 'breaking'
are often indistinguishable in social life. The absence of a clear distinction seems to
entail the view that the everyday world is more or less chaotic - a suggestion
contrary to most of our experiences of it. Towards the end of the second chapter he
was less cautious about these matters:
Given the rules of the social order, we find that individual participants develop ruses and
tricks for achieving private ends that are proscribed by the rules, in such a way as not to
break the rules (1953:38).
This rather tortuous sentence describes what on other occasions he more elegantly
called 'gain strategies'; but both formulations convey implicitly the misleading idea
that social rules are external regulations which must either be observed or abused.
However, in actual conversations it seems that abusing social rules is not only
tolerated, it is often demanded. Much later in the doctorate he mentioned this
curious phenomenon:
rules of tact are followed, often boredom sets in. If rules of tact are broken, often
embarrassment sets in. Apparently a fundamental source of involvement consists of the
slight infraction of tactful rules ... (1953:257).

If

Here a strange notion of rule-following is at work; indeed, perhaps the notion of
rule-following is on holiday. 2 And yet this account is intuitively believable: the

problem is to explain the apparent paradox that whilst it makes sense to talk about
both the rules of social interaction and about pressures to adhere to them, we
typically follow rules by ignoring them in some way or other. Clearly this practice
has little in common with rule-following in a game such as chess, since 'slight
infractions' of stipulations such as 'bishops move diagonally' dissolve the game. By
contrast, at the right time and place, infractions in social life enhance rather than
undermine the activity. Is it, then, that the notion of the rule obfuscates analysis?
Against this must be placed the appeal of many of Goffman's re-descriptions of
everyday encounters, which show normative guidelines present in the most trivial
exchange or outburst, even in apparently spontaneous 'spill-cries' such as oops!
(1981:101- 2). In this example the spill-cry denotes a minor failing and a temporary
loss of control, which the vocal sound attempts to cover over whilst repairs are done.
It also points to the tacit directive in public life to maintain silence - this being a
show of deference to others present. So, rules of interaction seem to be everywhere
- a thought which prompts another: where lies the infertile soil, if even a split
second of talk contains ritual constraints? The success of his analysis of oops! raises
the suspicion that all outbursts are impregnated with similar treasures. If so the task
of cataloging them will be never-ending, and cumulative work impossible.
The implication of this is that if the analysis of the ritual uses of talk is not going
to limit itself to the citation of discrete examples, it must clearly distinguish rule
following from rule breaking and then specify the rules in question.
Goffman's doctorate attempted to classify and describe both the rules followed by
crofters on a Scottish island and the means by which they circumvented such rules. 3
This approach pointed to the complexity of conversational exchanges without
raising the question of their precariousness. His admirable concern to delineate a
field of study - that of face-to-face interaction - was too programmatic, the
consequence being that instead of analysing pressures upon us to contravene social
rules, he often bypassed this important detail. This simplification opened the door to
such uninspiring claims as 'a person who breaks rules is an offender; his breaking of
them is an offence' (1953:35). From this he proceeded directly to a taxonomy of rule
breaking in conversation: good form but dull content.
Goffman's schemata of conversational practice were heavily dependent on the
material he had to hand. Much later, in Relations in Public (1971), the rulefollowing skeleton of his doctorate was fleshed out with new supplies;
conversational repair work. Examples of remedial exchanges presented him with a
means of re-invoking his earlier insight that 'slight infractions' of everyday rules are
often demanded by social encounters. Here, amongst the 'slop of social life'
(1971: 171), the details of remedial interchanges induced an overhaul of prior
classifications.
Underlying remedial interchanges is 'the cross of personal character', evident in
the simplest ritual dialogue:
A: Would you pass the milk?
B: Here.
A: Thanks. (1971:223,175).
A's offer of thanks is not only courteous, it also shows him to be alive to the fact
that an infringement on B has been made. And structurally speaking, A's 'thanks'

also begins and ends a closing sequence to the conversation. Here, then, the slightest
deviation from everyday rules is seen to produce remedial work. The sequence is
ritualised, and attends in advance to the possibility of adverse reaction, a
consideration often noted by a minimizing response by B such as 'it's okay' or 'no
problem' 4 - another case, incidentally, of a ritual move doubling up as a structural
one, since the emission will also be heard by A as closing the conversation.
The formality of this interchange provides a clue to the rule following dilemma
which was somehow missed by Goffman himself. It seems that rules of interaction
outline the types of respect strangers have reason to expect of each other. Following
them, therefore, implies that those present are strangers and that the balance sheet
of personal involvement and friendship is precisely nil. One of the ways in which we
affirm different sorts of friendship is by showing that the ritual constraints owed to
strangers have been suspended. 5 The infraction of everyday rules is a means of
expressing and affirming relationships and, in certain contexts, to act otherwise
displays an inappropriate level of formality. It is by these means that the
infringement of structural constraints is put to ritual use; although the alarming
consequence of this is that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish acts of
conversational aggression from ritualised displays of affection. Producing this
distinction requires an intricate combination of animation and bracketing,
variations to which allow strikingly different interpretations of the same semantic
strip of talk. With this in mind consider the following episode, which Goffman cited
as an example of a 'devastating' comeback to an aggressive gambit:
A: Fuck you.
B: Man, you haven't even kissed me yet. (1971:216, footnote).
In context Goffman was right to interpret this episode as exemplifying rule violation
amongst strangers. Here B handles an unsubtle onslaught with destructive humour.
However, other interpretations of the episode are possible 6 and it is instructive to
replay the exchange, hearing the conversational snippet not as aggression but as
bravardery between friends. Now the first pair part 'Fuck you' is rather different, no
longer a verbal attack but instead a demonstration of a friendship in which rules
specifying apt occasions for swearing can be infringed. Literal understandings of
aggression are inverted. B's reply is not, in these circumstances, an attack on A, but
an affirmation that A was right to assume this level of intimacy, an exercise B nicely
celebrates with an entertaining interpretation of A's exclamation.
Perhaps, then, the precariousness of talk, revealed most clearly by the prevalence
of remedial work in conversation, attests to the difficulty of matching appropriate
levels of rule breaking to the distinctive requirements of particular relationships.
In Relations in Public Goffman didn't suggest that the baseline for rules of
interaction is a set of normative guidelines for regulating conduct between strangers.
If he had he could have made progress with the dilemma of the indeterminacy of rule
following in social life. Instead he presented a series of observations which skirt its
rim, coming very close to the strangers solution at one point:
... a very limited set of ritual enactments are available for contrite offenders. Whether one
runs over another's sentence, time, dog, or body, one is more or less reduced to saying
some variant of 'I'm sorry' .... After an offence has occurred, the job of the offender is to

show ... that whatever happened before, he now has a right relationship - a pious attitude
- to the rule in question - and this is a matter of indicating a relationship, not
compensating a loss (1971:149, emphasis in original).

The emphasis on the way talk indicates relationships is the nub of the strangers
thesis, and one solution to the troublesome question of rule following and rule
breaking in social life.
In the next section I look more closely at the notion of the ritual self in Goffman's
work. This will pave the way for a discussion of its reception amongst conversation
analysts later in the paper.
The Ritual Self in Talk
At different times Goffman proposed different definitions of the terms ritual, self
and talk; sometimes he did this in the spirit of conceptual elaboration, sometimes as
a way of marking a change of direction or focus. Caution is therefore required. In
his Face- Work paper, written soon after the completion of his doctorate, he
suggested that a ritual order is an accommodative process, in which people avoid
discrediting information by an intricate assemblage of 'blindness, half-truths,
illusions and rationalizations' (1967:42- 3, orig. 1956a). Here the self is conceived as
a shelter maintained by discretion and tact. We 'save face' because in everyday
encounters 'there is much to be gained from venturing nothing' (1967:43), and by
these means the precariousness of the social world is lent a little solidity.
Underpinning this early account is the assumption that ritual is an amoral technique
for the management of self; it lubricates the social machine so as to produce
frictionless interaction. His 'Supportive Interchanges' paper, in Relations in Public,
begins by defining ritual as 'a perfunctory, conventionalized act through which an
individual portrays his respect and regard for some object of ultimate value ... '
(1971 :88). This is almost an about-turn on his previous definition, as it inserts
morality into what was previously considered to be a matter of technique or
competence. The justification for the to and fro between matters of morality
(perhaps of honour) and competence is that there is
a functional relationship between the structure of the self and the structure of spoken
interaction [which must bel pursued with ritual care (1967:36, orig. 1956a).

Taken together these two accounts of ritual suggest that the self is a deity of sorts,
that it is itself the object of ultimate value which should be honoured. Another early
paper concludes with precisely this thought:
... in one sense this secular world is not so irreligious as we might think. Many gods have
been done away with, but the individual himself stubbornly remains as a deity of some
importance (1967:95, orig. 1956b).

These different senses of ritual can be wrought together to connote an
accommodative technique and homage to a moral good, these two meeting up in
Goffman's notion of the self. In the Face- Work essay he spoke of the 'ritual roles of
the self' in terms similar to this, the self being expressed in the flow of events, as a

player in a ritual game, struggling to cope with 'the judgmental contingencies of the
situation' (1967:31, orig. 1956a). In an excellent piece of exegetical work, Lofland
has shown that, despite shifts of label, Goffman - in his early work at least operated with two accounts of self: an official self, located and contained in a social
situation, and an all-too-human-self, situated behind these 'ready-made' (Goffman
1961 :88) role performances. 7
There are no definitions of the word 'talk' in his early work, a strange omission.
Later, in Forms of Talk (1981), he went to some trouble to distinguish our various
uses of this word. His most general claim was that talk 'lodges' us in 'some sort of
intersubjective, mental world' (1981 :71). In Frame Analysis he defined talk slightly
differently, as 'a rapidly shifting stream of differently framed strips ... ' (1974:544)
- a definition which questions the cohesion of any segment of talk by suggesting
that different frames may be in operation.
These formulations are useful tools for analysing face-to-face interaction.
However, their usefulness is limited by the ill-formalised notion of rule-following
which underpins them. I want to suggest that this problem can be overcome by
viewing interactions with strangers as bedrock specifications for rules of interaction.
In the presence of strangers talk lodges us in an intersubjective world and provides,
by its own hands, a means of honouring those around us with a vast array of small
offerings and courtesies. We can ask a pedestrian the time and express abundant
thanks, we can display civil inattention in elevators, respectfully marking the
presence of others with silence, and we can apologise ahead of time for the minor
intrusions we make. By these strategies we honour those we know only through
proximity, expecting only reciprocity in return. In the presence of friends talk
provides a means of affirming that these people are not strangers, an affirmation we
perform perversely by dishonouring those around us, a license made possible by a
reciprocally relaxed attitude to prevailing rules of interaction. The institutionalised
rule breaking which is entailed here is, however, precarious, and the possibility of
'going too far' always exists. Hence no matter how intimate two people are, both
maintain the right to reclaim the ritualised honour owed to them by the other; that
is, both maintain the right to ask to be treated as a stranger.
But matters are yet more complex: the foregoing discussion has assumed that
ritual honour or dishonour is something owed to an individual. But the word
'individual' is too clumsy a tool for detailed analysis. Instead it is necessary to
distinguish the individual from the self, this distinction allowing us to allocate
several selves to each individual, which in turn allows us to consider the different
ritual honours or dishonours owed to each. In Relations in Public Goffman warned
us that the words 'person' and 'individual' cover 'multiple sins of imprecision'
(1971 :23) and it was this issue to which his warning alludes. Failure to heed this may
push analysis towards the two selves thesis at work in The Presentation of Self, and
in perhaps all dramaturgical studies, in which the person is reduced to a manipulator
behind a set of masks.
Important for this argument is an early Goffman paper about embarrassment.
Distinguishing the self from the individual he made the following stab at explaining
this strange phenomenon:
Because of possessing multiple selves the individual may find he is required both to be
present and to not be present on certain occasions .... Embarrassment ensues: the individual

finds himself being torn apart, however gently. Corresponding to the oscillation in his
conduct is the oscillation of his self (1967:110, orig. 1956c).

Embarrassment marks breaches in a person's conduct which somehow lessen or
conflict with a prior sense of identity. Although there are many different types of
embarrassment, each contains this component. Embarrassment is thus an excellent
resource for research on the self. Here it highlights the importance and difficulty of
successful rule-breaking in face-to-face interaction; the interactional problem
occurring when an individual is unsure about what the correct response to an
individual should be. Rules appropriate for one of the individual's selves seem
inappropriate for another. For example, it is often difficult to consult a doctor who
is also a friend. Typically we become embarrassed when a conflict of this sort is
enacted in an encounter - a dilemma nicely highlighted by an unusual source: the
failure of formal attempts to specify in advance rules of conduct. Practical
resolution to interactional difficulties requires work irreducible to a formal structure
of the kind, 'in this circumstance, do this!'. As is well known, Goffman sometimes
held up one version of this kind of instruction book - etiquette manuals - as an
exemplar of formal sociological description; but he knew that these are thin
descriptions of our actual performances. The writings of Mrs. Emily Post and others
are of some direct use to sociology, but their long term value will probably be an
unintended one - to highlight the impossibility of providing a book of rules for
etiquette which is akin to a book of rules for chess. Etiquette manuals cannot but
ignore our manipulation of rules of interaction. The limited value of these manuals
is disclosed in Behaviour in Public Places:
It is my feeling that the main drawback to using ... [etiquette manuals] as data for social

science is ... that these books tend to provide a mere catalogue of proprieties instead of an
analysis of the system of norms underlying these proprieties (1963:5- 6).

This reflective element was emphasised in his earlier analogy between people and
deities, where he suggested that individuals are viable gods because they reflect upon
the significance of ritual (1967:95, orig. 1956b).
Our ability to manipulate norms of behaviour is a severe test of sociology's ability
to describe even a single example of face-to-face interaction. Interpretation seems to
rest instead on a non-formalizable and less tangible faculty, that of judgment.
Goffman resisted this conclusion, choosing instead to insert the formalization of
rules of social interaction as a regulative ideal. Consider this extract from his Replies
and Responses paper:
However tortured the connection can become between last person's talk and current
speaker's utterance, that connection must be explored under the auspices of determinism,
as though all the degrees of freedom can somehow be mapped out, conceptualised, and
ordered, somehow neatly grasped and held, somehow made to submit to the patterning-out
effected by analysis (1981:72).

The threefold repetition of 'somehow' suggests that the connection between last
person's talk and current speaker's utterance cannot be grasped under the auspices
of determinism, cannot be mapped out, conceptualised, ordered and subjected to
the patterning out effected by analysis. Nevertheless, he chose to avoid the

conceptual chaos which results when the aspiration towards this conceptual order is
abandoned. 8
Although he often parodied cumulative ambitions for the analysis of talk,
likening them to attempts to construct a 'Pandora's box, Goffman was more of an
architect than he was prepared to admit, 9 and it is on this front that his work is
closest to the scientifically-minded conversation-analysts, to whom I now wish to
turn.

The Cumulative Analysis of Talk
Talk is one of the way in which we express and manufacture a sense of self, a task
each of us achieves against a backcloth of shared expectancies, guidelines and risk.
The importance of the last of these is attested by our willingness to cover over the
interactional blunders of those around us, and by our subsequent tact about our
tactfulness, a point noted in The Presentation of Self (1959:227- 230).
Strangely, the honouring of ritual selves takes place under the aegis of our shared
expectancies of how talk itself is made. These shared expectancies concern the ways
in which we produce talk. At issue, then, is talk's structure. Following the pivotal
work of Harvey Sacks, it has become common to refer to this production as a
machinery which cranks out conversations and is used consciously or unconsciously
by all competent members of speaking communities. Conversation analysts attempt
to lay bare the nuts and bolts of the machine, showing in ever more detail just how
finely tuned talk's engine is, and needs to be, to accomplish the work we set it. Only
with the aid of hindsight and in the light of many empirical studies, can we see how
imaginative Sacks was to realise that mundane talk is intricately patterned. In
Relations in Public Goffman acknowledged this, saying: 'Sacks has been an
originator in the close study of conversation sequencing, and I am much indebted to
him' (1971:151, footnote).
His use of the indefinite article here silently recognises the contribution Sacks' coworkers, Emanual Schegloff and Gail Jefferson. It is perhaps also a veiled attempt
to include his own work under this mantle.
Conversation analysis opened up a more or less autonomous field of inquiry naturalistic talk. This concerns itself with, so to speak, talk's machinery rather than
with its mechanics; a distinction which enables a cumulative methodology to be
forged out of Sacks' belief that talk can be studied as an observational science. From
it sprang the almost botanical attempt to specify the basic constituents of the
structure of talk. The seminal paper here is Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson's study,
'A Simplest Systematics for the Organization of Turn-Taking for Conversation',
published, significantly perhaps, in a linguistics journal, Language (1974:696 -735).
The title alone is very revealing, as it signposts the authors' intention not to disclose
merely a simple outline of turn-taking in talk, but to disclose the most simple
account thereof. Turn-taking is the first building block in the cumulative,
observational analysis of conversation. Once established the basic minimum
requirements of a 'speech-exchange system' can be considered. The trivial point that
conversations are structured by turn-taking is immensely significant: it is a crucial
preliminary to the linchpin of conversational-analytic work; namely, that a lot of
conversations can be analysed in terms of adjacency pairs and the subsequent

sequencing of a 'turn's talk'. Sacks and Schegloff defined an adjacency pair as the
ordering of two utterances, spoken by different speakers (1973:295- 6). (This
account makes no ritual claims, although other accounts - perhaps noticeably the
one given by Heritage (1984:247) - do build in this element.) The notion of
sequencing is a looser, though similar observation, which Sacks et at. explained thus:
... it is a systematic consequence of the turn-taking organization of conversation that it
obliges its participants to display to each other, in a turn's talk, their understanding of
other turn's talk. More generally, a turn's talk will be heard as directed to a prior turn's
talk, unless special techniques are used to locate some other talk to which it is directed
(1974:732).

Various kinds of mistakes are made during a turn's talk which may require 'repair'
- the fourth element of the foundation of conversation analytic work,
complementing turn-taking, adjacency pairs and sequencing. Conversation analysts
have successfully delineated the different sorts of self-repair and other-repair that
are routinely used in everyday talk, and incorporated their findings into the
conversation analytic foundation. This foundation is, in a sense, both 'context-free'
and 'context sensitive', since talk's machinery is present in all contexts of
conversation, and is therefore largely independent of any particular context (Sacks
et at. 1974:706).
Perhaps the last decisive assumption (it may be a discovery), which is pertinent to
the conversation analytic hope of securing a cumulative inquiry is Sacks et at. 's
belief that
... it appears likely that conversation should be considered the basic form of speechexchange system ... (1974:735).

This last claim is the fifth and final building block. Sacks' legacy, put crassly, is his
realisation that conversation is susceptible to detailed analysis, and his
demonstration that cumulative work is possible. He could demonstrate this because
turn-taking, adjacency pairs, sequencing and repair are generic features of
conversation. The last ten years work in conversation analysis has been the partial
realisation of the cumulative project envisioned by Sacks in the 1960s and formalised
by him in the early 1970s. 10
This foundation makes no normative claims, and whilst its structure may be put to
ritual use, there is no requirement for this to take place. Goffman emphasised this
distinction, contrasting the following exchange:
A: What's the time?
B: It's five o'clock.
With:
A:
B:
A:
B:

Do you have the time?
Sure. It's five o'clock.
Thanks.
(gesture) It's okay (1981: 15 -16).

The first of these exchanges meets what Goffman called basic 'system requirements',
the second what he called 'ritual requirements'. The notion of system requirement is
very similar to Sacks' idea of the machinery of talk, and, after the fashion of the
Simplest Systematics paper, he specified the nuts and bolts of the system
(1981:14-15). However, there is no conversation analytic analogue of Goffman's
subsequent specification of ritual requirements. This is not surprising - Sacks and
his followers are not interested in the manufacture of self in talk, but in the actual
machinery of talk.
Goffman frequently attempted to construct a bedrock level for the description of
the ways in which selves are expressed and produced in talk. In part both expression
and production draw upon talk's machinery, in part they append themselves to this
structure. Except for those occasions when systemic features of talk are used
ritualistically, his concern with system constraints was always secondary to his
concern with ritual constraints. The focus was the ways in which we manipulate
normative rules to produce a sense of self.
The intractable vagueness of this programme partially explains the scepticism it
meets amongst conversation analysts. Even after ransacking talk for the project,
Goffman was obliged to draft and re-draft bedrock specifications, unable to
convince himself that a foundation existed for his project comparable to that
identified by conversation analysts for theirs. His introduction of the human
mechanics into the inquiry seemed to undermine the attempt to specify simple first
principles. By contrast, Sacks and his students built up an impressive array of
empirical studies in what Schegloff came to call the 'conversation analytic business'
(CA). The apparent security of CA's foundation, whose crystalline structure is the
antithesis of Goffman's rough classifications 11 allowed a plethora of studies with
naturalistic data, in which an analytic trunk could be shown to support transcribable
branches and leaves. Against this Goffman's legacy seems to amount to little more
than what Schegloff has aptly called a 'sociology by epitome'. Schegloff recently
compared this legacy to Sacks', using the distinction between system and ritual
constraints:
This is, I think, the central point. For Goffman, what he calls 'ritual' is the heart of the
sociology in studying interaction; the 'system' is somehow pre-sociological, engineering,
biological, whatever. Here I think him seriously mistaken (1988:97).

Schegloff makes two clear criticisms here, the first concerning Goffman's
misunderstanding of sociology, the second his mistaken preference for the
ritualistic. The suspicion is that both criticisms confuse points of difference with
points of error. Schegloff is right to say the Goffman sees ritual at the heart of
sociology and that he consequently underplays the systemic features of talk; but he is
wrong to suggest there is somehow a 'better' sociology for Goffman to practise, as
he is wrong to conclude that Goffman must think that the systemic is 'biological,
whatever' - why must he think this? Perhaps Goffman just thought that system
constraints are a different focus of inquiry, existing on the blurred edges of his own
concerns. The decision to leave them there is neither more nor less justified than
CA's decision to put them centre stage. What sort of justification could there be?
Instead it is probably more accurate to say that Goffman had different interests to
those of the conversation analysts, but that on occasion these interests meshed.

CA's criticisms, if they are to be effective, must show weakness in his
idiosyncracy. Their efforts to do this almost invariably focus on one element of his
work: his eclectic method of data collection. 12 The baseline for CA's critique is that
the analysis of talk can be an observational science, and that the scientific study of
talk is better than a speculative study thereof. Sacks was the first to describe what is
specific to CA's procedure:
I want to argue that, however rich our imaginations are, if we use hypothetical, or
hypothetical-typical versions of the world we are constrained by reference to what an
audience, an audience of professionals, can accept as reasonable.
Our business will be to proceed somewhat differently. We will be using observation as a
basis for theorizing .... (Sacks 1984:25- 26, originally from unpublished lectures,
1966-71).

These programmatic comments clarify matters: Sacks claims here that people who
use invented data are constrained by what they and their audiences will beforehand
find reasonable. Contrary to this, CA begins with observations which fuel
theorization. Some comments on Sacks' comments are called for.
The claim that CA is an observational science cannot mean that his analysis is
presuppositionless: we approach everything with the aid of an array of
presuppositions and there is no reason to believe that the study of conversation is an
exception. However, this doesn't mean that CA's project is senseless, just that the
'observational science' slogan requires specification. Probably it means that CAuses
presuppositions which are unproblematic and trivially true. Sacks' subsequent claim
to derive theory from observations of actual conversations also requires
specification - probably theory here means generalization.
Yet Sacks' point about the importance of naturalistic observation remains. It does
indeed seem to be the case that his argument is forceful, and that invented data is
weakened by its need to display the prior understandings of analyst and audience. 13
Goffman was almost certainly wrong to exercise a blanket avoidance of transcribed
data; by so doing he cut off avenues of research in advance and with no gain. 14 And
whilst it is true that he rarely attempted the close description of talk which is
associated with CA, transcribed data would have been useful to his project of
describing the general characteristics of social interaction.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember the differences between his sociological
practice and CA's. Goffman constructed conceptual schemata and exemplified them
in a manner similar to the research produced by CA. But unlike CA he supplemented
this procedure by undermining these efforts. He never tired of reminding his readers
that his schemata are inadequate descriptions of the complexity and heterogeneity of
the social world. Typically he did this by showing their inadequacy with counterexamples subsequently employed in the construction of new schemata. Later the
inadequacies of these schemata were shown. By these means his analysis remained,
in Weber's expression, 'eternally young' (1948:112). 15
This style of analysis is anathema to CA. The clearest rejection of it has been given
by Schegloff, for whom the assumption that sociology has eternal youth is a hasty
and ill-justified 'analytic nihilism' (1988: 118) - an expression which nicely suggests
a neo-Kantian underpinning. But Schegloff's acute paper runs into problems when it
merges two quite separate issues: that of human freedom on the one hand, and the

possibility of cumulative work on the other. Schegloff suggests that Goffman's
analytic nihilism is 'motivated by an assertion of human freedom (a sharp turn from
the closing of Stigma, where he teases those who would keep a corner of the world,
or was it the soul, safe from sociology)' (1988: 117).
Schegloff's frustration with what he takes to be Goffman's argument is evident in
his indifference to the details of the passage from Stigma (is it world or soul?). The
passage Schegloff has in mind, in any case, is probably not from the end of Stigma
but from the end of Goffman's essay, 'Role Distance'; but the more important point
is that the whole discussion of freedom obfuscates rather than clarifies, as both
Goffman, Schegloff and just about everyone else routinely accept an
unphilosophised belief in human agency. But where Goffman and Schegloff really
do disagree is over the question of a cumulative sociology, and on this question
Schegloff's analysis is beautifully clear and penetrating. Sloganising his thought
somewhat, one could say that he believes that Goffman's assumption of a noncumulative sociology is too hasty, and that CA's work is a demonstration of its
falsity. There is, though, a compromise solution here: accept cumulative work for
system constraints but not for ritual ones.

Multiple Seljing 16
Small talk and passing exchanges are some of the ways by which we exhibit
deference to those in our immediate presence; talk of this kind is a small token
which, at its purest, elicits nothing but mutual honouring. First pair parts such as
'Hi! How are you' are not questions about a person's well-being but little ceremonial
gifts. Like other gifts, the pleasure of receiving them turns into embarrassment
should the offering be made too often in too short a space of time - a point
accounting for the feeling of awkwardness experienced by people who meet the same
people regularly in the corridors of large institutions. Rituals of this sort are the low
risk, low return, bread and butter fare of public life. At bottom they exhibit the rule
following characteristics which affirm respect for those known only by proximity,
and they ask only reciprocity in return. Earlier I suggested three aspects of rules of
social interaction:
1.
2.
3.

that they are bedrock specifications for conduct between strangers,
that such rules are broken as a perverse way of showing friendship, and
that displaying friendship by rule-breaking is precarious because interactants
must gauge the appropriate level of rule breaking and abuse for different
relationships - a taxing accomplishment.

Too little rule breaking may make the person appear too formal, too much too
aggressive. Context, biography and accompanying animation are essential
ingredients of successful formulae. However, there is a form of insurance that can
be taken out to offset the liability of unsuccessful rule breaking. The policy draws
upon our general capacity to talk as if someone else were speaking. Goffman
referred to this as embedding or footing: it is a device we use to distance ourselves
from what we say; in a strange way embedded words free-float, owned by no-one. A
footing is a projection of self of uncertain status; as Goffman nicely put it: 'In truth,
in talk it seems routine that, while firmly standing on two feet, we jump up and

down on another' (1981:155). By embedding rule-breaking talk speakers limit the
amount of remedial work necessary should the exchange fail. This is possible
because such talk is not attributable to an identifiable person, and failed messages
can be framed as inconsequential play.
Embedded talk is not just an insurance policy; amongst other things it is a form of
entertainment: comedy, for example, depends upon it. Here I intend to consider
only the way embedded talk overcomes the precariousness of our frequent decision
to affirm friendship by expunging etiquette. It manages this by circumnavigating
one of the sequencing system constraints - that a turn's talk should show
understanding of prior turn's talk. Insurance is possible because this constraint can
be placed in abeyance. Because talk is sequential the success or failure of a piece of
rule-breaking is normally displayed in next turn's talk. Contrary to this, embedding
makes it possible to defer this display by complicating the notion of the speaker. The
result is that whilst competent interactants can respond straightforwardly to the
surface form of a turn's talk, they must hesitate before judging the tenor or import
of speaker's words. From a ritual point of view, the procedure is amoral, amenable
equally to the honouring and dishonouring of selves. Goffman described the
procedure for embedding talk as a production format (1981:145). His first
description of this is buried in a footnote in Relations in Public, where he
commented that people sometimes 'clown ... a character' not their own, allowing
themselves to be ventriloquized, assuming perhaps that 'real rules only apply to real
people' (1971:155, footnote). And later he outlined the gist of what became the
Footing paper:
... the individual does not go about merely going about his business. He goes about
constrained to sustain a viable image of himself" in the eyes of others .... Each lurching of
whatever the individual is standing on will have to be offset, often by his leading into the
fall with a self that has been projected as unserious, the real person thereby made free to
take up tacitly a counterbalancing position (1971:223).

These observations underpin the more sophisticated accounts of embedding offered
in Frame Analysis and Forms of Talk, which analysed our habit of playing both
ventriloquist and puppet at the same time. In order to explain the way in which we
separate ourselves from what we're saying, Goffman classified different types of
speaker. In Frame Analysis he distinguished four:
1. the principal - the person or party held responsible for the position attested to
by the meaning of what was spoken;
2. the emitter - the 'actual sounding box' - the speaking entity;
3. the animator - the expressive actions accompanying talk;
4. the figure - the human or non-human characters enacted by the speaker
(1974:517 -23).
A person frequently enacts all of these different speakers at the same time. In his
Footing paper he reworked this analysis, running together the notions of 'emitter'
and 'animator', and distinguishing 'principal' from 'author'; the former being the
position established by the speaker, the latter the creator of that position. Taken
together Goffman called the animator, author and principal the 'production format'
(1981:144-5). The notion of the 'figure' was kept although left out of this
definition (1981: 147). The result of the conceptual elaboration is the loosening of the
connection between speakers and their talk. Goffman made the point graphically:

... although it will never be that a two-headed green man from Mars will debate with the
ghost of Andrew Jackson, it is structurally just as easy during real talk to replay a
purported scene between these two as it is to replay a conversation which occurred that
morning with the postman (1974:524).

A structural and a ritual point follow from this. Structurally, the complexity of the
notion of the speaker makes the linchpin of conversation analysis - the sequencing
of turns at talk - look less impressive; for whilst it is true that a recognition of prior
turn's talk is displayed in present turn's talk, there may be an infinite number of
ways of effecting that display. 18 Goffman's target hereabouts is Sacks and
Schegloff's claim that answers to questions are only understood by their 'sequential
placement' (Schegloff and Sacks 1973:299; Goffman 1981:51, footnote). The
suspicion is that the decision to treat sequencing at an almost Parsonian level of
abstraction renders the analysis which follows true but trivially so; since anything
which sequentially follows a question is in danger of being read as an answer.
Goffman put the matter tersely, saying that this account of sequencing cannot be
disproved (1981: 51, footnote). Conversation analysis places an incredible burden on
the notion of sequencing, since if its analysis fails to limit what will count as
sequence, conversational structure will evade prior accounts of its form. Instead,
conversations will be seen to lift themselves up by their 'own bootstraps', to be
continued by any intelligible response spoken by any credible principal or figure.
Thus conceived, conversations can be contingently strung together by anything the
imagination can flail at, these including frame-breaks, reflexive comments, changes
in footing, bracketing and passing thoughts somehow equivalent to verbal scratches
or yawns. System constraints are honoured or abused, in the course of which they
are themselves presented as thin accounts of talk's machinery (1981 :73- 4).
Ritual matters are no easier to resolve. Speaker complications warn analysis
against the conflation of different 'I's under the umbrella term 'identity'. The shifts
in meaning between the statements, 'I feel a chill,' 'I will take responsibility,' and 'I
was born on a Tuesday,' evade easy description (1974:519). Goffman acknowledged
a debt to Wittgenstein's Investigations here, and with good cause. Wittgenstein's
interrogations of our different uses of the words 'I' and 'my' have shown that 'there
is a great variety of criteria for personal identity' (1958:#404, emphasis in
original). 19
The ease with which a speaker can talk as if he were a two-headed man from Mars
or the ghost of Andrew Jackson magnifies the problem of the referents 'I, 'me,' and
'self'. The complexity of ritual talk not only emphasises the difficulty of saving faces
and honouring selves; it also points to the problem of saving the different faces and
of honouring the different selves of a person. And after that there is also the
strangers problem to contend with. Goffman's analyses of everyday talk attempted
to describe the shifting meanings of the word 'I' .20 The conversation analytic focus
on the sequential organization of talk tells us little by itself about the problem of
self-reference. 21
To make progress Goffman sought out an empirical realm in which individuals
are obliged to project one and only one self during extended strips of 'fresh talk';
i.e., during extemporaneous talk (1981: 146). One such realm is the world of the disc
jockey (hereafter DJ). DJs produce a fluent flow of words under conditions that lay
speakers would be unable to manage (1981:198), making remarkably few faults.

Nevertheless, mistakes are made and these can be taped and transcribed. From one
set of transcriptions Goffman classified and described different sorts of fault,
distinguishing, for example, a stutter from a slip or a gaffe, and different corrective
measures, these ranging from the truculent decision to 'drive through' a speech
error, at one extreme, to the embarrassed 'flood-out' at the other (1981:209-19).
The professionalism of the DJ has made audiences more sensitive to on-air speech
errors than to similar errors in everyday talk.
Speech faults are significant for DJs because they jeopardise their efforts to limit
prevailing definitions of the situation. A looser constraint affects lay speakers although there are exceptions - such as when it is felt that an individual should be
upset, evidence for which should and is most easily provided by situated speech
disturbances (1981:223). But such faults usually point to elements of a verbal
performance that a speaker would prefer not to be identified with.
When DJs talk they often manage to convey a sense of intimacy with people they
cannot see and do not know. In the course of this they ritually honour strangers as if
they were their friends, an interactional equivalent of walking on water. But their
performance is on occasion even more miraculous, for DJs resolve the strangers
problem without recourse to rule-breaking; that is, they display friendship, and are
heard to be so doing, without the resources often displayed in everyday encounters.
Goffman suggested that DJs manage this by aligning themselves exclusively with
what he called their frame space. This space is delineated by a speaker's production
format and by his participation status; the first of these referring to the combined
notions of animator, author and principal, these constituting Goffman's account of
the speaker; the second to the relation between the hearer of an utterance and the
utterance itself (1981 :230). The DJ's basic skill is the manipulation of frame space so
as to project an individual with a single self.
But there are exceptions, the most extreme being formal announcements, where
even the DJ's single self is taken from her: nothing is spared save the actual sounding
box. In general, however, DJs project a friendly self. This projection is presented as
all the person is; a fact often institutionally enforced - as, for example, in the case
of the B.B.C., who contractually prevent their announcers from appearing in
commercials, i.e. they prevent announcers from displaying an other self (1981 :238).
Conveniently for DJs, fresh talk is the talk most easily understood and the one best
exemplifying friendship: they therefore attempt to simulate it. In addition, DJs
endeavour to avoid touching the sensitivities of their audience. To this end they steer
clear of matters such as race, religion or political belief. Because of the heterogeneity
of audiences there are all too many taboo subjects, each a possible cause of offence.
It seems that the best way of detailing the problems facing the DJs' awkward
footing is to describe situations when their erstwhile professionalism fails and they
take a fall. A simple account of this will now be given.
A DJ's fresh talk breaks down when speech faults occur. Faults can be of this
form: 'To me English is an enema ... enigma!' (1981:216); these revealing an anxious
self observing a drowning one. DJ-ing problems here are analogous to problems
facing lay speakers. But in addition to these, DJs are beset by 'faultables'; that is, by
faults containing an ambiguity which would normally pass unnoticed in everyday
talk. One of these is the 'contextual unfreezing' of expressions, as when an ABC
sports announcer declared (1981:216): 'Leo Lebel has been competing with a pulled
stomach muscle, showing a lot of guts!'

Another concerns problems of reference, shown by a newscaster who said: 'The
loot and the car were listed as stolen by the Los Angeles Police Department'
(1981 :245).
Another the problem of innocent words with salacious meanings, as in the
following radio commercial:
Calling all parents, calling all kids! Here's your chance to buy a Davey Crockett bed - yes,
friends, Hunt's Furniture Store has Davey Crockett beds - it's a twin size bed, just right
for the kids - with scenes of Davey Crockett in action on the mattress! (1981:252).

An odd exception hereabouts is Contestant shows, in which presenters and
participants alike aim to maximise faultables in the fault-free production of
humour. But in general avoidance is the norm. When faults do occur they can be left
without a change of footing. However, should remedial work be attempted delicate
footwork will be required, as disowned selves must come to light. The simplest
example of a re-alignment involves the shift from friend back to DJ, a move cued in
by a frame-bracketed comment such as: 'I've lost my place, I'll have it for you in a
moment' (1981 :294); a confession which destroys the illusion of fresh talk. Other realignments display other selves, these on occasion being wittier and shrewder than
the self the DJ would normally choose to project. For example, amidst routine
banter, a DJ's speech fault prompted him to let us glimpse a reflexive self at work,
who dryly commented: 'I was going to say it was a nice name before I tripped over a
syllable' (1981 :294); where humour and accuracy (note that the DJ said a syllable
and not an unspecified number of syllables) inappropriately reveal a keen mind
leashed to pat talk.
The most extreme case of re-alignment occurs when a DJ is caught in an
unmistakable disaster. In these terrible circumstances his final obligation is not to
save face as DJ - that is already lost - but to save the self which is cripplingly
embarrassed by being identified with what the unsalvageable DJ self has just said.
The ritual talk which follows such disasters is a final honour to a fallen deity.
Goffman found a beautiful example of this in the following commercial, in which a
male announcer said:
Try this wonderful new bra ... you'll especially love the softly lined cups that are so
comfortable to wear. You gals who need a little something extra should try model 718. It's
lightly padded and I'm sure you'll love it. I do! ... I mean I like the looks of it ....
Well ... what I am trying to say is that I don't need one myself naturally, as a man ... but if
you do, I recommend it ... How do I know? I really don't ... I'm just reading the
commercial for Mary Patterson who is ill at home with a cold! (1981:302, 'dotted lines' in
original).

This segment of ritual talk highlights the distinction between individual and self. The
individual is 'a palpable thing of flesh and bone', a see-able entity. The self, by
contrast, is not a physical thing; instead it is a set of claims made on behalf of the
individual. These two definitions allow us to consider the different selves of the
individual: on some occasions these will be complementary, on others contradictory
or competing. This is, I think, the most appropriate way of understanding
Goffman's elegant vocabulary: by defining the individual as flesh and bone and the
self as a set of claims we can understand the idea of a person's 'footing' as a

projection of self which displays a falsifiable claim about what the individuaf is.
Ritual talk endeavours to honour viable projections of self and to accommodate
discredited ones. In the above commercial there is only one identifiable person, but
there are many selves, and these can be identified and itemised. There is the:
1. listener's friend; this self surfacing in the comment: 'you'll especially love the
softly lined cups ... '.
2. appreciative wearer of the bra; this fateful self emerging in the line: 'I'm sure
you'll love it. I do!'.
3. admiring onlooker of bras; shown by his statement: 'I like the look of it';
4. self as man; as in his claim: 'I don't need one myself naturally, as a man ... '.
The fifth self is already at some distance from his official one: it is the
5. self as self-questioner; the pertinent line being: 'I recommend it. .. How do I
know? I really don't ... '. Sixth self is the official one, the
6. DJ; this being shown by 'Try this wonderful new bra ... '. The seventh and final
self is the
7. self as human, all too human; this one appearing in the desperate comment:
'I'm just reading the commercial for Mary Patterson who is ill at home with a
cold!'.
This example provides data for what we all catch ourselves doing: changing
footing so frequently that we fall over. Ritual talk honours our successes and is
tactful about our failures. In the commercial the announcer projected a straggle of
contradictory selves in quick succession, only to find that he had already discredited
most of these by prior utterances. Indeed, by the end the only selves that had
survived his hara kiri were those concerning, firstly, his claim to be a man and,
secondly, his prosaic claim to be human, all too human. 22
Implied in this section is an offbeat criticism of CA's forward lurch. The criticism
is offbeat because it is of a quite different order to those which allege that CA is too
deterministic, too behaviouristic or too micro-sociological. Instead, on a different
footing as it were, this section has questioned the methodological decision to
prioritise observation. Whilst it is true that the observational science banner was
useful for certain purposes, it is question-begging as well. It was useful in organising
a cumulative inquiry which could resist the assumption that the details of everyday
life are residual features of theoretical schemata. It is question-begging because the
slogan falsely suggests that theories can be exclusively derived from observations.
The slogan is false because observations are underpinned by presuppositions; and
hence CA's foundation is itself above bedrock level, resting on presuppositional
stilts about social life and talk. Ironically, its falsity might not have been a serious
problem: the existence of these presuppositions wouldn't have been serious if they
had been either trivially true or unproblematic. However, at least one of these
presuppositions - concerning the definition of the speaker - has been shown to be
problematic. Realising this has allowed several conversation analysts to make use of
Goffman's elaborations. 23
Slightly more newsworthy is the methodological point that CA's forward lurch
can be fuelled by both observation and by the sharp conceptual work of which
Goffman is sociology's finest exponent. Thus the forward lurch can be made both
forwards and backwards, the former by detailed studies of naturalistic data, the
latter by the elaboration of the significance of analytic presuppositions. Divorcing
these inquiries is to the detriment of both. 24

Conclusions
In this paper I argued that ritual talk honours and accommodates individuals. To
give this thesis force the individual must be given different selves, each of which can,
and usually is, honoured and accommodated in its own right. Individuals are flesh
and bone, selves are projected sets of claims. The selves of individuals are honoured
in accord with prevailing rules of interaction and within the constraints and
possibilities of the sequential organization of talk. The baseline for this honour is
what I've called the strangers thesis, which is that rules of interaction bestow honour
on those known only by proximity. Rules of interaction are sometimes broken as a
perverse way of affirming friendship. This strategy is, however, precarious, and
when it fails remedial work follows. Sequential studies of talk must recognise the
complexity of the notion of the speaker, and identify the different speaking selves of
the individual. Work in this area revives interest in a valuable legacy, and bridges the
antagonistic divide between Goffman and conversation analysis.
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

8.
9.

Panhandlers, mobs and (other) street performers are unratified and constitute a problem
beyond the reach of this paper.
See Wittgenstein's Investigations para 38.
For this succinct summary I am indebted to Robin Williams' essay 'Goffman's Sociology
of Talk' in Jason Ditton's collection: The View From Goffman (1980), Macmillan,
especially pp. 210-211.
In French this process of minimization is taken to its logical extreme, B's reply being,
almost invariably, de rien - 'it's nothing'.
I think this is one (paradoxical) way of fleshing out Giddens' nice observation that 'Even
the most evanescent of encounters tends to establish something of a bond of moral
solidarity between participants'. See 'Erving Goffman as a systematic social theorist' in
his Social Theory and Modern Sociology (1987), Polity Press.
At one point in the 'Remedial Interchanges' paper Goffman recommends this use of the
subjunctive mood as a research technique. He wrote: 'a technique of analysis: to get at
the significance of a move, play through the interchange not only as it actually (or
purportedly) happened, but also as it would have happened had all the participants acted
in the most routine, mechanical fashion imaginable or, contrariwise, the most cuttingly;
then compare' (1971:209-10).
See J. Lofland (1980): 'Early Goffman: Style, Structure, Substance, Soul', in J. Ditton
(ed.) The View From Gojfman, Macmillan. Lofland's findings agree with my suggestion
that The Presentation of Self contains a two selves thesis. Lofland doesn't seem to think
that this thesis is a weakness, however, which is my own opinion.
When put in these terms Goffman's project is remarkably similar to Habermas' studies
of 'communicative action'.
Goffman skirted between contingency and necessity when he supposed that we make
sense of conversational exchanges by a limited set of reinterpretation schemata, each of
which could be applied to any segment of talk. This supposition promises cumulative
work by contracting to specify a metaschema of these different reinterpretation
schemata. If Goffman could do this he would avoid the criticism that his work was just
an 'endless catalogue' of examples (1981:68). Goffman produced such a metaschema,
although he couched it in tentative terms. Nevertheless his concluding comments about it
were unequivocal: 'It is some such framework of frameworks that we must seek out; it is

10.
11.
12.

13.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.
22.
23.

24.

some such metaschema that will allow us to accumulate systematic understanding about
contexts, not merely warnings that in another context, meaning could be different'
(1981:70).
See Atkinson and Heritage's edited collection of papers: Structures of Social Interaction
(1984), Cambridge University Press.
The allusion here is to Wittgenstein. See his Philosophical Investigations (1958:#107).
For example, see David Helm's review of Forms of Talk in Human Studies
(1982:147- 57), or W.W. Sharrock's review of Frame Analysis in Sociology
(1976:332- 4).
Curiously, Goffman himself supported the use of tape recorders for the analysis of talk
in the introduction to his doctorate (1953:3), although he later expressed reservations these concerning the practical problems of taping the crofters' conversations.
The only example of Goffman using an extended piece of transcribed data is in Frame
Analysis (1974:548- 9). Ironically the data is accompanied by no analysis.
This analysis owes much to Robin Williams' paper. 'Understanding Goffman's
Methods' in Drew and Wootten (1988).
This odd expression derives from Frame Analysis (1974:521, footnote).
This point re-emerged as 'Felicity's Condition' (American Journal of Sociology June
1983).
At risk here is the metaphorical description of talk as a machine, which now begins to
look misleading.
Wittgenstein showed that statements such as 'this is my foot' assume that the foot has
certain qualities, which, if missing, undermine the sense of 'my'. Thus, when walking my
foot is unproblematically mine, but is it equally mine when anaesthetized or paralysed?
(1958:#411).
On these matters I have been helped by Gareth Evans' paper, 'Self-Identification', in his
The Varieties of Reference (1982:205- 57), Oxford University Press.
By this wording I want to leave open the possibility of using sequential organization as
part of an explanation of multiple selfing.
The awkward question of frame is not resolved here, however.
See D. Maynard and D. Zimmerman: 'Topical Talk, Ritual and The Social Organization
of Relationships' in Social Psychology Quarterly (1984, Vol. 47. No. 4 pp. 301-16). See
also D. Maynard: Inside Plea Bargaining Plenum Press (1984). S. Clayman's paper,
'Footing in the Achievement of Neutrality' has shown how interviewers change footing
to preserve an image of neutrality. Also of note is D. Tannen and C. Wallat's paper
'Interactive Frames and Knowledge Schemas in Interaction: Examples from a Medical
Examination/Interview' in Social Psychology Quarterly (1987. Vol. 50 No.2
pp. 205- 16).
Let me mention very briefly one piece of empirical analysis which has very nicely
combined research on the sequential organization of talk with studies of its ritual
significance. This project looked at one of the ways by which individuals shift between
their different selves. On these occasions talk's machinery is put to ritual use. A recent
paper by Michael Emmison investigated the social organization of ceremonial
congratulations and commiserations (see M. Emmison 1987: 'Victors and Vanquished:
The Social Organization of Ceremonial Congratulations and Commiserations' in
Language and Communication (1987, Vol. 7, pp. 93 -110). Emmison analysed
transcripts of post-match interviews with sports personalities. After the triumph or
failure of the day these figures often receive praise or commiseration from media
interviewers. However, they often meet this reception by suggesting that outcomes could
easily have been different, and that future games will disclose different fortunes. Thus,
within the experience of winning today is the thought of losing tomorrow. Typically this
is displayed in talk by downplaying the claims attributed by the interviewer to the

winning self. The winner uses structural resources to shift footing to other selves with
more modest claims. Emmison showed how carefully placed laughter can downgrade
ascribed status, allowing the individual to shift between selves (1987:107).
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